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EXPLANATORY NOTE REGARDING SYMBOLS 
The original transcript filed herein was deemed by the 
parties and found by the trial court not to be a verbatim 
transcript. The parties have by stipulation formulated a 
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses which is on 
file herein. The record of the hearing before the District 
Court subsequent to the trial, at which hearing the original 
transcript was discussed, was filed herein on June 9, 1957 
and will be referred to as "supplemental record." The sym-
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MARY GILCHRIST CURRY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
H. DONALD CURRY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the 2nd Judicial District, 
Davis County, State of Utah, 
Honorable John M. Wahlquist, Judge. 
This brief will outline the inequity resulting from the 
Trial Court having granted a decree of divorce to Appellant 
against his will. It will show that he did not at any point 
desire the divorce~ particularly if he were thereby deprived 
of the custody of his children. Moreover, since the total 
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effect of the decree is tantamount to an award of divorce 
to Respondent, the argument will be directed chiefly to that 
practicality, rather than to the technical state of the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(A) Statement of Facts as to Pleadings and Procedure. 
This was a divorce action brought by Plaintiff, Mary 
G. Curry, Respondent herein, against her husband H. Don-
ald Curry, Defendant and Appellant, and Shell Oil Com-
pany, Defendant. There is no controversy as to Shell Oil 
Company. 
To Respondent's complaint praying for a divorce on 
the grounds of mental cruelty Appellant filed an answer 
and counter-claim, in both asserting that Respondent had 
no grounds for a divorce, that it was to the best interests 
of the family as a whole and particularly of the children 
that the marriage continue, and that Appellant did affir-
matively desire that the marriage be not broken (R. page 
9, par. 7). Appellant alleged that if grounds did exist upon 
which to base a decree of divorce they ran in his favor; that 
if upon a trial of the cause the Court deemed that a divorce 
was necessary, the decree should be in his favor and he 
should be given custody of the children (R. page 10, par. 
,f; and page 11). 
The cause was tried to the Court sitting without a Jury 
on June 26, 1956, at Farmington, Utah. 
When the evidence had been presented and both parties 
had rested, Appellant urged the Court not to grant ~he 
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divorce and argued in support thereof that no substantial 
amount of evidence had been adduced to establish the stat-
utory ground of mental cruelty relied upon by the Respon-
dent. The Court advised counsel from the bench that while 
the evidence on the point of mental cruelty might not be 
strongly persuasive, he nonetheless thought that the Re-
spondent no longer loved Appellant and. that the Respondent 
at least was actively unhappy with the marriage relation-
ship. The Court further stated that he believed the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2nd 79, 296 P. 
2nd 977, required him to grant a divorce when he found a 
marriage relationship that was "intolerable" to the parties. 
The Court decreed a divorce in favor of Appellant but 
granted custody of the four minor children of the parties 
to Respondent ( R. page 27) . 
The parties were given 10 days to agree upon a prop-
erty settlement and support and alimony payment agree-
ment, which was done and the Court approved the terms 
thereof. The Court in his Findings of Fact found "that the 
stipulations and agreements of Defendant (Appellant) have 
been most generous to the Plaintiff and children and that 
should he hereafter request a modification of the tern1s 
of the stipulation, consideration should be given to such 
request without regard to any change in his financial status 
or circumstances" (R. page 22, par. VI). 
(B) Statement of Facts as to Material Events. 
Appellant and Respondent were married on December 
15, 1945 in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Appellant was then 
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and is now a United States citizen and a geologist for Shell 
Oil Company. Respondent was and is a citizen of Canada. 
The couple moved to the United States where they lived 
consecutively in California, Wyoming, and Utah. Four , 
children were born to them: Jane in November of 1948 in 
California; Gil, March 1950, Clay, October 1951, and Deb-
orah, April 1953; in Casper, Wyoming. The couple moved 
to Salt Lake City in the summer of 1953 and have since 
resided there and in Bountiful, Utah. 
In Casper, \Vyoming, in 1953 Appellant underwent a 
vasectomy (surgical sterilization) operation upon the te-
quest and approval of his wife, Respondent herein. Appel-
lant agreed to the surgery, and both parties seem in accord 
that the reason for the operation was to prevent further 
pregnancies and improve the health and well being of the 
wife (T. p. 5 lines 9-16). 
In January of 1954 Appellant was hospitalized in Salt 
Lake City by Dr. J. Floyd Cannon for hemorrhaging in 
connection with a gastric ulcer attack. In June of that year 
he was again hospitalized and underwent surgery for cor-
rection of the stomach condition. During both periods of 
hospitalization his wife was in aln1ost constant attendance 
at his bedside and exhibited marked devotion (T. page 7, 
lines 20-23 and p. 13, lines 6-9). 
In June 1954, imn1ediately after Appellant's hospital-
ization, Respondent 'Yent to her parents~ home in Canada 
for a vacation with the children. Appellant remained in 
Utah to convalesce from his illness for a time. Respondent 
extended her vacation in Canada an additional four weeks 
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time (T. page 5, lines 4-6). Appellant went up to Canada 
to bring Respondent and the children back to Utah. A Mr. 
"X" lived in Canada near her parents and she saw him 
during that vacation (T. page 5, lines 6-8). Upon her re-
turn from Canada to Salt Lake City in the late summer of 
1954, her affections for her husband were less than they 
had been theretofore (T. page 4, line 30). In the autumn 
of 1954 after her return from Canada, Respondent's brother 
and "X" came to the home of the parties in Bountiful, Utah 
and stayed there for about one week. During this visit Re-
spondent showed affection for "X" in the presence of Ap-
pellant. When her brother and "X" left, Respondent ex-
hibited marked disappointment. At this time the parties 
had somthing of a "show-down" and she admitted to Ap-
pellant that she had great affection for "X" (T. p. 4, lines 
25-30). In the autumn of 1955 Respondent was to go to 
Canada to attend her brother's wedding. Appellant was 
opposed to this because of her feelings toward "X" who 
lived in Canada and he was fearful that the relationship 
would progress further. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DI-
VORCE HEREIN SINCE THE TOTAL EFFECT 
THEREOF IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DECREE 
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, AND SHE DID 
NOT POSSESS GROUNDS TO SUPPORT SUCH 
A DECREE. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DI-
VORCE WHEREIN CUSTODY OF THE CHIL-
DREN IS IN RESPONDENT IN THAT THE 
RESULT THEREOF IS GROSSLY INEQUIT-
ABLE TO APPELLANT AND THE CHILDREN. 
ARGUMENT-POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DI-
VORCE HEREIN SINCE THE TOTAL EFFECT 
THEREOF IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DECREE 
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, AND SHE DID 
NOT POSSESS GROUNDS TO SUPPORT SUCH 
A DECREE. 
Here is a case where some of the usual frictions that 
exist in the normal home occurred. These normal frictions 
over a period of ten years of married life had been resolved 
by the parties from time to time. It was not until the late 
summer of 1954 when respondent became enamored of a 
man in Canada that the situation in the home of the parties 
reached a state which the trial judge characterized as being 
"intolerable to the plaintiff" (Respondent) (R. page 21, 
par. IV). 
There was no showing of any overt acts on the part of 
the appellant husband which would give rise to the type of 
mental cruelty contemplated in our statute. Respondent 
relies on Title 30-3-1 (7) Utah Code Annotated 1953 in 
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7 
seeking a divorce. At that citation and as grounds for a 
: divorce the wording appears: 
"Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defen-
dant to the extent of causing bodily injury or great 
mental distress to the plaintiff." 
It is respectfully submitted that neither the Code Cita-
tion nor the cases interpreting the same coutenance a di-
vorce where mere unhappiness of one of the parties exists. 
Our Supreme Court has held in Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 
580, 245 P. 335 that 
"Courts can grant divorces only for the particu-
lar causes prescribed by law and then only when 
grounds or cause for divorce is proved by substantial 
evidence." 
In White v. White, ... Utah ... , 281 P. 2d 745 it was 
held where both parties in a divorce action appear to be in 
equal wrong or where evidence fails in the statutory grounds 
for divorce, the Court in exercise of sound discretion may 
deny prayer for divorce. Our Supreme Court in Holman v. 
Holman, at 94 Utah 300, 77 P. 2d 329 has held that 
"Mere drifting apart because of failure to syn-
chronize interests or ambitions is no grounds for 
divorce although it may be that the parties cannot 
or should not live together." 
As given in the statement of facts the trial judge in 
the instant case declared he felt himself bound by our 
Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Wilson, supra, where 
at page 979 the Court is heard to say: 
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"Where it appeared that the purposes of matri-
m'Ony had been destroyed to the extent that further 
living together was intolerable, it was in accordance 
with the Court's duties and. prerogative to grant 
Plaintiff a divorce." 
It is clear that in equity cases such as this the Supreme 
Court may review both the law and the evidence. The plain-
tiff in the instant case testified that Mr. Curry's cruelty 
to her arose through the effect it was having on the chil-
dren and felt that she could "get along with him without 
growing children, but now I cannot" (T. page 1, lines 29-
30). Here we have a statement from respondent herself 
that she could get along with him if it were not for the 
effect on the children. All the evidence, however, was to 
the effect that she believed Mr. Curry was adversely affect-
ing the children through his religious attitude. The Court 
has indicated at page 3 of a transcript of proceedings on 
file herein held subsequent to the divorce that he found 
nothing objectionable to appellant's religious beliefs. At 
said page the Court said: 
"If you want a finding of fact that the Court 
sees nothing objectionable about his (appellant's) 
religious beliefs, I'll make such a finding for you. 
I think they are not objectionable. I think they are 
highly commendable. I can do that on the religious 
issue if it would be helpful'' (S/R, page 3). 
Her contention that he was hurting the children fails. 
There is nothing further in the transcript of evidence of 
cruelty other than some nebulous references to sexual in· 
compatibility. No overt acts of cruelty are complained of 
by respondent. Chief Justice Straup in Doe v. Doe, cited 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
at 48 Utah 200 and 158 Pacific 78, declared that Courts, on 
the grounds of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much 
less evidence than they do the husband, and that before a 
decree is granted to the husband on such ground, it ought 
to be a somewhat aggravated case. 
In the instant case since the decree ran to appellant 
the trial court is rather bound to be heard to say that the 
situation was an aggravated one and the equities favored 
appellant. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial judge was in 
effect acting in a role of psychological commentator or phil-
osopher rather than as a judge in interpreting his respon-
sibility in the light of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, in finding 
that excessive unhappiness existed and therefore he should 
grant a divorce. Since there were no overt acts on the part 
of appellant constituting grounds for a divorce under the 
mental cruelty section of our Code, and since the grounds 
actually were in appellant's favor, the trial judge clearly 
extended his prerogative in granting the divorce as he did, 
when the result thereof is tantamount to granting the di-
vorce to respondent, and when it sets up the inequities it 
does as to appellant. 
ARGUMENT-POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DI-
VORCE WHEREIN CUSTODY O,F THE CHIL-
DREN IS IN RESPONDENT IN THAT THE 
RESULT THEREO·F IS GROSSLY INEQUIT-
ABLE TO APPELLANT AND THE CHILDREN. 
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It is clear that respondent's unhappiness arose from 
her own actions in actively seeking outside the family re-
lationship a ron1antic association, or in allowing he·rself 
to become so involved with another. Granting that the 
situation did mature into an active unhappiness, on her 
part, it resulted from her own acts and not from acts or 
failures of the appellant. 
In Wilson v. Vvilson, supra, the opinion states at para-
graph (2) 
"* * * when people are well adjusted and 
happy in marriage, one of them does not just out of 
a clear blue sky fall in love with someone else; and 
when this occurs it usually is an indication that the 
marriage has disintegrated from other causes." 
This comment is, of course, consonant with normal 
human experience. Its strict application, however, to the 
facts of the instant case might well be improper and unjust. 
T·he evidence shows a devoted wife at the bedside of her 
sick husband for several hours a day almost daily on two 
occasions of hospitalization in January and June of 1954. 
Their maid likewise would: be heard to say that they were 
affectionate, that there 'vere no difficulties between them 
as far as she could tell from 1952 until July of 1954. (T. 
page 16 STIPULATION RE TESTIMONY of LYDIA 
SMITHERS.) Then comes that fatal trip of respondent to 
her childhood home in Canada in July 1954, where she 
stayed four weeks longer than she originally intended, and 
\vhere her husband apparently had to come up and get her. 
In the girlhood scene, away from a convalescing husband, 
thrown into close association with another n1an, and amid 
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scenes and activity of which she was fond, who may say 
that all this did not overweigh the usual rule that one does 
not "fall in love" "out of a clear blue sky." This wife did 
fall in love in Canada in the summer of 1954, and her "fall-
ing" struck a blow to her marriage and to appellant's and 
the children's substantial rights and interests therein. 
Under our statutory provision at Title 30-3-10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, providing for custody of the children 
in the wife, an inequitable situation arises in the instant 
case. Here we have a wife who has created her own unhap-
piness. The statute provides for the wife to have custody 
of the children, other things being equal. We have her un-
equivocal statement (T. page 4, line 5, et seq.) that she, if 
the divorce is granted, will take the children with her to 
Canada. There is no evidence that the children desire to go 
to Canada. There is evidence that the point in Canada to 
which Respondent intends to take them is backward and 
lacking in the educational and cultural advantages the chil-
dren have in Utah (T. page 14, line 15, et seq.). Respondent 
had, four years earlier, actively sought an agreement on the 
part of Appellant to have him sterilized as a safeguard 
against pregnancy and with a feeling that the four children 
constituted an adequate family. 
The Appellant is foreclosed from having any more 
children of his own. His work keeps him in Salt Lake City. 
It is very remunerative work and it is economically prudent 
that he remain here. \Vhen Respondent exercises her rights 
under the present decree and carries out her expressed in-
tention to take the children to a point in Canada, some 900 
miles from Bountiful, Utah, we have the Appellant virtually 
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permanently deprived of any association with those children. 
The inequity of this is so apparent as to require little ampli-
fication. Moreover, the interests and welfare of the children 
are probably better served by keeping them here. 
We do not believe the Supreme Court is saying in Wil--
son v. Wilson, supra, that divorces are to be granted cate-
gorically where active unhappiness or mere incompatibility 
are found. To so hold would be to nullify the requirements 
of the statute which make the existence of specific grounds 
for divorce a condition precedent to a decree. "Unhappi-
ness" is not a ground for divorce in this State. We believe 
each case must be judged on its merits, and upon the cir-
cumstances attending it. If the present decree is to run its 
logical course, we will find four children of American citi-
zenship taken to Canada by a mother whose failure to make 
a marriage work has caused the divorce in the first place. 
It will leave a husband in Salt Lake City, virtually required 
to stay here because of economic reasons, forever foreclosed 
from having other children of his own. A husband who at 
all stages of the proceedings herein has opposed the divorce 
and the breaking up of the family on the basis of a com-
pletely valid desire to keep the family together and to have 
some influence over and association with his children. 
Appellant is well able to care for the children himself 
(T. page 13, line 28, et seq.). 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the record herein appellant respectfully 
prays this Honorable Court for relief in the alternative as 
follows: 
I. For an order reversing the holding of the trial court 
that a divorce should be granted, and ordering that the 
decree herein be set aside. Or, failing this 
II. For an order modifying the terms of the decree 
to the extent that if the decree shall stand in other particu-
lars, the custody of the minor children of the parties be 
given to Appellant. Or failing this, 
III. For an order preventing the respondent from 
taking the said children out of this jurisdiction and away 
from Appellant's ability to visit with them frequently. This 
restriction should remain in effect at least for the time 
Appellant remains in this jurisdiction or for a period of 
six (6) years' time, whichever is least. Or for such relief 
to Appellant as to the Justices of this Honorable Court seems 
meet and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, BOYER & RONNOW, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant, H. Donald Curry. 
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